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The patient 
The metaphor of the «body politic» is an old one, dating at 
least back to the Middle Ages and being famously depicted on the 
frontispiece of the first edition of Hobbes’ Leviathan. It has proven 
resilient in the conceptualization of public affairs to date, the 
people incorporated in the state often being treated as the body 
politic.1  
Indeed, the metaphor has been frequently used in the ongoing 
debates in the West about mass migration due to a nation-state’s 
central role - be it in terms of the official regime, logistical capacity, 
national character, or self-identity. Hillary Clinton, who suffered 
electorally from Donald Trump’s promise to build a wall with 
Mexico, argues that «if we don’t deal with the migration issue it will 
continue to roil the body politic».2 Likewise, the migrant crisis of 
2015 hit a real nerve in many European countries, wracking national 
political systems and populations. A British activist reckons that 
«the ways in which governments treat people who are moving in 
 
1  Exemplary is Jared Diamond: Upheaval: How nations cope with crisis 
and change, London 2019. Diamond draws on the metaphor not only in 
describing how the polity functions, but also in prescribing right «behav-
iour». Contrary see Niall Ferguson: Shrink thinking: Are countries really 
like people?, in: Times Literary Supplement, 1 November 2019, 12-13. 
2  Quoted in Matt Stevens et al.: Hillary Clinton Says Europe Must «Get a 
Handle» on Migration to Thwart Populism, in: New York Times, 22 No-
vember 2019. 
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search of safety and opportunity have become a stark indicator of 
the health of those democracies».3 
Here, the metaphor of nations as personified abstractions will 
be used as a starting point in exploring how public policy is made 
in the West today.4 Related notions of individual (ill-)health offer 
insight into the (ab-)normal functioning of a liberal democratic 
system. Further, the present volume’s guiding principle of Krankheit 
und Gesundheit based on the conception of One Health helps clarify 
the condition described. It points to the holistic approach that should 
be taken to understand and to treat such dysfunction in a liberal 
democracy. 
A medical examination 
In addition to the policies’ substance, i.e. how governments 
deal with immigrants, the process of policymaking must be exam-
ined. The question arises: to what extent is «healthy policymaking» 
being practiced in Western democracies regarding such topical 
societal concerns as immigration? More fundamentally, how far 
can the customary ideals of careful consideration of information, 
constructive exchange of different opinions, and amiable consensus 
be reasonably expected in this highly emotive context? 
In the following essay, I find that the requirements for such 
deliberation about mass migration and other contemporary hot-
button issues are not currently vouchsafed in Mitteleuropa or else-
where in the West. A primary cause and consequence of this deficit 
have been the rapid rise of nativist populism and its great influence 
on immigration policymaking. 
For concerned politicians and commentators, engaging with 
feelings within - and for/against - liberal democracy is imperative 
 
3  Lucy Hovil: Telling Truths about Migration, in: International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 13/2 (July 2019) 199. 
4  The information and websites in this essay are up to date as of 1 March 
2020. 
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so as to enable common reflection, dialogue and agreement. My 
analysis of approaches that have been pursued of late by liberal 
democrats suggests that identifying what is not to be done in treating 
the body politic is easier than identifying what is to be done. There 
are policymaking pitfalls to avoid, which otherwise stoke fears 
about immigration and render public debate even more extreme. 
How these fears can and should be assuaged, however, remains 
unclear. Neither the means nor the justification for the state to 
determine their permissibility is evident in liberal democracy.  
I conclude that absent an effective and acceptable treatment, 
deficient discourse and mistaken policies will at times result. Dys-
function in policymaking – and profound dissatisfaction with liberal 
democracy – will therefore persist about mass migration. The body 
politic will – can – never develop a total immunity to «illnesses» in 
popular deliberation. At most an alleviation of the symptoms may 
be achieved. 
The dysfunction 
That immigration receives close attention in the West today is 
readily understandable. It is on a larger scale and of a changed com-
position from earlier decades. That immigration is a matter of great 
societal concern and of considerable discussion is also understand-
able. It affects the native population’s sense of identity and well-
being - as well as the immigrants themselves - as people are inse-
cure about the future of their community. As the German political 
scientists Gary Schaal and Felix Heidenreich put it simply, immi-
gration policy is about how we wish to live together: «Was ist es, 
das wir gemeinsam wollen und wertschätzen?»5 The terms and jus-
tifications in immigration policymaking are not self-evident; they 
 
5  Gary S. Schaal, Felix Heidenreich: Zur Rolle von Emotionen in der Demo-
kratie, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 30 July 2013: 
https://www.bpb.de/apuz/165744/zur-rolle-von-emotionen-in-der-
demokratie  
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must be worked out country by country, provision by provision. 
While they are, a degree of tension is unavoidable. 
Alone the language commonly used speaks to how important 
and how charged the issue of immigration is today in public. For 
example, the influx of 2015 has been characterized in Mitteleuropa as 
an «immigrant avalanche» (qua an unstoppable force of nature) and 
as a «humanitarian imperative» (children’s bodies washing up on 
Mediterranean beaches). Where for one group, the German ship’s 
captain who rescued migrants from the sea is a «hero», for another 
group she is a «pirate». A moral fervour overcomes a large part of 
the population in debating immigration. This fervour has been 
manifested in the rancour and animus that characterise exchange: 
«accusations of xenophobia fly in one direction, dismissals of starry-
eyed idealism in the other».6 Despite being a complicated and tan-
gible policy issue, immigration tends to be understood in simplified 
and symbolic terms by the general public. 
At all times, realizing the ideals of liberal democratic discourse 
in immigration policymaking seems wishful thinking. The debate 
in Switzerland, for example, around the Masseneinwanderungsinitia-
tive of 2014 was a testing – and sadly telling – time for that country’s 
political culture, which had hitherto been widely admired for 
rational, reasoned argument. It is an issue, arguably more than any 
other, that possesses the power to divide opinions, to lead to polar-
ization and radicalization. Germany already struggled with this 
issue prior to 2015. In early 2001, Interior Minister Otto Schily 
proposed Germany’s first-ever regulated immigration program. 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, he decided against submitting 
the bill to cabinet, judging it an unpropitious moment.7 Extreme po-
sitions dominate debate, despite most voters maintaining moderate 
views. This culture of political debate is widely acknowledged to be 
defective. It seems, a columnist notes plaintively, «zu viel verlangt, 
 
6  Special Report: Migration, in: Economist, 28 May 2016, 16. 
7  Further see Malcolm MacLaren: Framing the Debate over the German Im-
migration Bill: Toward Reasoned Policymaking, in: German Law Journal 
2/16 (2001): https://doi.org/10.1017/S2071832200003990  
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einem halbwegs zivilisierten Gegenüber erst mal zuzuhören und 
gegebenenfalls sachlich zu widersprechen.»8 Pleas for a new Streit-
kultur in Germany are made by leading newspapers and even the 
Bundespräsident.9 Can the polity still build majorities for profound 
reforms urgently required? 
These strong, divisive feelings evoked by mass migration - and 
other hot-button issues like Brexit and climate change - have been 
manipulated and exploited by political entrepreneurs to challenge, 
with considerable success, present norms, institutions, and prac-
tices. In the US, «Trump’s virulent rhetoric taps into the grievances 
of a white working or middle class and encourages it to embrace, 
revitalize, and act on its prejudices».10 These feelings have been in-
flamed beyond dissatisfaction with the content of particular policies 
to now express general frustration and disenchantment with liberal 
democracy and support for alternative regimes. 
Where in past, the establishment parties across Europe tended 
to advance moderate positions soberly, of late these have been 
adopting populist-inspired rhetoric and policies on issues like im-
migration. A normalization and outbidding may be observed. 
Mainstream politicians also pander to fear, hatred, anger, etc. for 
 
 8  Peter Maxwill: Lädierte Streitkultur: Wir schweigen die Demokratie 
zugrunde, in: Spiegel Online, 21 July 2019: 
https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/streitkultur-und-
demokratie-wie-wir-sie-zugrunde-schweigen-a-1261127.html  




Bastian Berbner: «Germany Talks»: It's Impossible to Talk to You!, in: Zeit 
Online, 1 October 2018:  
https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2018-09/germany-talks-discussion-
argue-constructively-political-adversaries-englisch  
10  Martijn Konings: Neoliberalism Against Democracy? Wendy Brown’s «In 
the Ruins of Neoliberalism» and the Specter of Fascism, in: Los Angeles 
Review of Books, 22 September 2019: 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/neoliberalism-against-democracy-
wendy-browns-in-the-ruins-of-neoliberalism-and-the-specter-of-fascism  
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votes, giving credibility to those feelings and undermining human 
rights, the rule of law, and democratic structures.11 
Populism is facilitated today by the internet, as it furthers frag-
mentation, polarization and radicalization in the citizenry.12 On one 
hand, bots and echo chambers amplify our views, and news websites 
trade in outrage; on the other, the use of social media hinders the 
shared understandings and conversations that are the basis of liberal 
democracy. The result is that «modern debate has a structural bias 
in favour of demagoguery and disinformation».13 
Regarding 2015, fearmongering by right-wing political parties 
and media outlets earned votes and boosted ratings. These ques-
tionable practices before - as well as after - that momentous sum-
mer had a negative impact on policymaking and have been partly 
why the migration took on epic proportions in Europe.14 The problem 
was «the way immigration was depicted, described, debated or 
demonised»15 and not the migrants’ arrival in larger numbers per se. 
These flawed discourses must be reformed if the body politic 
is to function as intended. This reform begins with greater public 
self-reflection by political and media actors. How then can the 
 
11  Generally see Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al.: The Future of Migration 




12  Inter alia see Cass Sunstein: #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of 
Social Media, Princeton NJ 2017. 
13  Steven Poole: Who wins from public debate? Liars, bullies and trolls, in: 
Guardian, 3 May 2019: 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/may/03/death-of-debate-
jordan-peterson-slavoj-zizek-alexandria-ocasio-cortez  
14  Further see Florian Lippert: Public self-reflection in the context of the 
European migrant crisis: Towards a new transdisciplinary model of dis-
course analysis in politics, media and the arts, in: Journal of European 
Studies 49/3-4 (2019) 336-353. 
15  In the British context, see Rachel Shabi: How immigration became Britain’s 
most toxic political issue, in: Guardian, 15 November 2019: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/15/how-immigration-
became-britains-most-toxic-political-issue  
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deliberative and judicious policymaking that is required on this 
emotive issue of national importance be facilitated? 
The parameters 
The policymaking process in Western democracies has several 
phases, roughly divisible into agenda building, formulation and 
adoption, implementation as well as evaluation and termination. 
The focus here is on the second phase, i.e. coming up with a national 
approach to deal with a perceived problem.16 The process of policy-
making is aimed at the most effective outcomes, achieved by the most 
appropriate means. Recourse alone to democracy and its decision-
making mechanisms does not ensure – may indeed prevent – 
«healthy» policymaking. A process that involves reacting to popular 
demands and results in broad consensus must be supported by 
reliable knowledge and a certain culture of debate.17  
Traditionally, the parameters for the policymaking process in 
Western democracies have been defined by the Rawlsian ideal of 
public reason, as effected by responsible politicians, quality media, 
and reasonable citizens. This ideal is emotion-averse: it intentionally 
excludes related motivations that are considered an improper basis 
for public policy- and decision-making. Put pointedly, emotions 
in politics are alien to the body politic, should be minimized, and 
belong in the private sphere. The prescription was not new, but 
it found renewed support due to the experience of the Interwar. 
Collective passions are held responsible in Europe for the atrocities 
of the Nazis and their collaborators, which constitute the antithesis 
 
16  Exemplary see European Commission, Quality of Public Administration: 
A Toolbox for Practitioners (Theme 1: Policy-making, implementation and 
innovation), Luxembourg 2017:  
https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId= 
8055&type=2&furtherPubs=no 
17  Generally see Marc Bühlmann, Hanspeter Kriesi: Models for Democracy, 
in: H. Kriesi et al.: Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatiza-
tion, Basingstoke UK 2013, 44-68. 
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of reason and humanity. In liberal democracy, the constitution, 
together with the whole legal system and the rule of law, may be 
seen as already geared to dampening and controlling passions.18 
In the specific context of public debate, ideas are to «do battle» 
with one another to enable citizens to inform themselves and to 
make the best judgments possible. This view finds its perhaps 
most developed version in Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action. Action must be characterized by reason, which is based alone 
on the «zwanglosen Zwang des besseren weil einleuchtenderen 
Argumentes».19 
In view of its nature and significance, the issue of immigration 
poses a challenge to this understanding of and approach to politics 
in Western democracies. No politics/policymaking is ever neutral; 
even in reasonable liberal societies, it is to an extent emotionally 
charged. Of late, politics/hot-button issues have been the subject of 
mendacious campaigning amplified by partisan media and resonat-
ing in voters’ anger. More helpful is to consider emotions in political 
participation/policymaking to be unavoidable, even indispensable. 
Moreover, feelings are neither good nor bad per se for democracy; 
outrage and anger can, for example, be a positive as well as negative 
force. Such an understanding distinguishes which are deployed/ 
used and how, with which goals and tactics, and asks to what extent 
these are connected to deliberative processes.20  
 
18  Generally see András Sajó: Emotions in constitutional design, in: Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law 8/3 (2010) 354-384. 
19  Jürgen Habermas: Sprachtheoretische Grundlegung der Soziologie. Philo-
sophische Texte. Studienausgabe, Frankfurt am Main 2009, I 144. 
20  Further see Priska Daphi: Presentation, 14. Bundeskongress politische 
Bildung 2019. Was uns bewegt. Emotionen in Politik und Gesellschaft, 
Leipzig, 9 March 2019: 
https://www.bpb.de/veranstaltungen/dokumentation/277643/sektion-
3-partizipation-was-treibt-uns-an-bach-saal  
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A diagnosis 
Under the political systems prevailing in the West, the pro-
spects for productive debate on a common good have been shown 
to be poor when the latter concerns the character and direction of 
the society. Especially in troubled times, democratic participation 
and processes may be destructive for the polity rather than con-
structive.  
To my mind, what is determinative of the culture of debate is 
how the different ways of knowing, especially the emotional, that 
are evoked in policymaking are dealt with. In the present context, 
feelings motivate our (re-)actions; they are the basis for our value 
judgements; and they shape «situational interpretations».21 When 
emotions in democratic life are misunderstood and mishandled, the 
vitality of the debate and ultimately, its facilitating processes will 
suffer. 
In face of the latter-day besorgte Bürger and Wutbürger and of 
the Siegeszug der Gefühle, politicians and political theorists have 
sought to make public policy regarding mass migration in ways that 
avoid «testing» the body politic, i.e. that do not give rise to distrust, 
divergence of opinion, and disagreement. Generally, the more emo-
tional a debate becomes, the louder is the call for its control, internal 
or external. 
For example, some politicians attempt to depoliticize the issue 
and to frame mass migration as merely a logistical challenge. These 
efforts are naïve or deceitful, but either way, they will prove unsuc-
cessful. The issue of mass migration cannot just be «managed» by 
government executives with the proper strategies, structures, and 
capacities; it is more than just a big admin job.  
The most famous attempt was German Chancellor Merkel’s 
promise at the height of the migrant crisis: «[w]ir schaffen das: Wo 
etwas im Wege steht, muss es überwunden werden, muss daran 
 
21  Paraphrasing G.S. Schaal, F. Heidenreich: Zur Rolle von Emotionen in der 
Demokratie. 
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gearbeitet werden.»22 As she had other policy challenges, Merkel 
sought to deal with it rationally and objectively, with detachment 
and moderation. This approach had been very popular previously.23 
The Wir-schaffen-das-promise did not, however, correspond to the 
public’s expectations or rather, own emotionality about the event. 
Where policy in other contexts might have been agreed to be alter-
nativlos, the sudden arrival of immigrants in great numbers provoked 
an intense search for alternatives. 
In the event, the German state coped very quickly and flexibly 
with the practical challenges of processing, housing, schooling, etc. 
the 1.1 million migrants who arrived in 2015. A marked and steady 
decrease in the number of immigrants has followed. In March 
2019, the European Commission officially declared the crisis in the 
member states to be over. To the state’s and Commission’s chagrin, 
the situation is otherwise depicted by rival politicians and other-
wise perceived by large sections of the public. Many in Germany, 
for example, continue to question the propriety of Merkel’s decision 
in August that year not to close the country’s borders to asylum 
seekers. They still worry greatly about immigrants, as many polls 
testify.  
Preventive measures 
Merkel’s characterization of the migrant crisis as foremost an 
administrative challenge may be thought of as an actual attempt at 
evading, rather than accounting for, the feelings implicated in 
 
22  German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the country’s refugee policy, Press 
Conference, 31 August 2015: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDQki0MMFh4  
23  As a German political scientist in 2014 observed, «[w]ir haben fast eine 
Debattenallergie in Deutschland, in Zeiten der grossen Koalition ganz 
besonders.» (Karl Rudolf Korte, quoted in Ingeborg Breuer: Zwischen 
Leidenschaft und Demagogie, Deutschlandfunk, 31 July 2014: 
https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/politik-und-emotion-zwischen-
leidenschaft-und-demagogie.1148.de.html?dram:article_id=293252 
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designing a national immigration regime. Emotions have long been 
treated warily, even ascribed a negative role in political processes. 
Of late, populists’ politics of fear has led to others’ fear of politics 
and to the recommendation of different approaches to militate 
against feelings’ influence on policymaking.  
A careful review of three such approaches advises, however, 
political elites not to condescend to the views of ordinary people, 
believing themselves entitled to impose their enlightened perspec-
tives and truths on the benighted masses.24  
1 — Attempts to disparage feelings (or pejoratively, passions) are 
misconceived, in principle and in practice. Hamlet-esque encomia of 
the «noble reason» that makes humankind «the paragon of animals» 
constitute a dubious prioritization of one way of knowing in politics. 
It valorises rationality in making sense of the world at the expense 
of possible contributions of other ways of knowing, e.g. intuition 
and imagination as well emotion.  
One cannot, and arguably should not, tell people whether and 
what to feel. Our feelings are simply what they are and are worthy 
of recognition as such in political processes; they deserve validation 
rather than judgment. That does not mean that we can, and should, 
express feelings whenever and however we wish. Nonetheless, 
neither being fearful of immigrants nor preferring limits on immi-
gration is «wrong» in and of itself. 
Attempting, moreover, to dismiss unconventional or incon-
venient attitudes by branding them as improper - or worse - will 
not shut down the political discussion. You won’t win over anyone 
to your viewpoint, as a US journalist notes, by insulting them.25 This 
preventive approach has, in any event, been effectively countered 
by populists, who urge the feelings’ expression as not only natural 
 
24  Paraphrasing Joan C. Williams: Metro vs retro: The rise of divisiveness in 
modern politics, in: Times Literary Supplement, 8 February 2019, 6. 
25  German Lopez: Research says there are ways to reduce racial bias. Calling 
people racist isn’t one of them, in: Vox, 30 July 2018: 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/11/15/13595508/racism-research-
study-trump 
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but also justified. They propagate the legitimacy – even propriety – 
of voters’ having them. 
Listening to and showing respect for others’ politics are integral 
to achieving broad consensus in policymaking. Emotions really 
become problematic when attempts are made to deny them. The 
expression of related sentiments in the native population, if widely 
shared and abiding, cannot be suppressed or long evaded. Politicians 
can gag themselves, but in a liberal democracy, they cannot gag 
the public (or press). These and the concomitant divisions in the 
body politic «will out», like truth itself, and may then be more the 
extreme. - For example, the majority vote in favour of Brexit was 
arguably caused by «the inability and unwillingness of liberal elites 
to discuss migration and contend with its consequences».26 
2 — An alternative appeal to citizens for trust in and deference 
to scientific and political leaders is also likely to fall on deaf ears. 
Although the leaders’ intent may genuinely be to give people what 
is in their best interests, a paternalistic, elitist approach will not be 
readily agreed to in the West. 
Some theorists have argued in favour of technical expertise, i.e. 
giving greater say to demographers, economists, and the like in 
determining policy. To give responsibility over to technocrats is to 
revert to «a system without anger and fondness», to rationalized 
governance devoid of irrational content.27 Experts’ understanding of 
a complex issue is presumed to be more astute and less self-interested 
than that of the average member of the public. This argument can 
be traced back to Plato’s time at least: there have long been intellec-
tuals who view the majority of citizens as «ignorant», «shiftless and 
flighty» and therefore would entrust power to an elite of «carefully 
educated guardians».28 
 
26  Ivan Krastev: After Europe, Philadelphia 2017, 25. 
27  Following the title of a conference «A system without anger and fondness? 
Emotions in the age of bureaucracy» held at the Max Planck Institute for 
Human Development, Berlin, in 2016. 
28  Caleb Crain: The Case against Democracy, in: New Yorker, 7 November 
2016: 
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The present reality in the West is, however, that the citizenry will 
not simply acquiesce in tighter limits on its participation in policy-
making. Citizens expect substantial acknowledgement of their views 
as well as own broad and deep involvement in the political process.  
Citizens consider themselves as «empowered» in what is oft 
characterized as an «age of individualism» in Western society. 
Many refuse to be dictated to by authorities - secular as well as 
religious - and seek to think and act for themselves, to «take back 
control», as Trump and Leavers sloganeered. This democratization 
of knowledge has been accelerated by high literacy rates and en-
hanced dissemination of news and communication.29 
Citizens are also aware that in a democracy, their vote has equal 
worth to others’ and their right to take part in government is the 
same. They value having a voice and participating in political pro-
cesses; they will assert their right to settle public issues as they wish. 
Ensuring public authorities’ input legitimacy, whatever the output 
legitimacy they can lay claim to, is a great concern, as the prevailing 
criticism of the EU’s democracy deficit attests. In immigration policy-
making, the cogent argument that existential questions must be 
democratically answered would need to be convincingly refuted. 
Georg Kohler, Swiss philosopher, puts it succinctly: «Der allerletzte 
Richter in der Entscheidung über die Humanität und ihre (Staats-) 
Grenzen ist in der Demokratie stets ‹das Volk› [… bzw.] die Mehr-
heit seiner Angehörigen.»30 
An alternative approach of appealing to trust and deference 
also underestimates the general public’s scepticism of and even an-




29  Further see William Davies: Why can’t we agree on what’s true anymore?, 
in: Guardian, 19 September 2019: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/sep/19/why-cant-we-agree-
on-whats-true-anymore 
30  Georg Kohler: Flüchtlingskrise: Der gute Hirte darf nicht zu gut sein zu 
anderen, sonst schadet er der eigenen Herde. Wo liegen die Grenzen der 
Humanität?, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 August 2019. 
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unresponsive leaders have of late evoked disenchantment, rejection, 
and backlash worldwide. Such attitudes are not without grounding 
in experience. As the number of arrivals rose quickly in 2015, far 
beyond expectations, the popular perception that European govern-
ments could no longer control their countries’ borders – a primary 
responsibility of the state – grew with it. Moreover, instances of 
policymaking about immigration that was sorely misconceived or 
promises about immigration that were flagrantly broken31 resist 
such an approach. In further policy contexts, Western governments 
have been revealed to have lied to their citizens. This understandable 
wariness toward government appeals for trust and deference is only 
intensified by populists’ accusations that the «powers that be» look 
on them with disrespect, do not take their interests into considera-
tion, or worse, are trying to hoodwink them.  
Two phenomena in contemporary political discourse reflect 
this lack of trust in and deference to political elites. On one hand, 
mass migration is the subject of many conspiracy theories. For 
example, the «Eurabia myth» resonates widely today in the West 
and has moved in political discourse from the far-right into the 
mainstream.32 On the other, calls are frequently made to «trust the 
people’ in public affairs and to have faith in «common sense» on 
matters of common good.33 
 
31  In terms of the former, the fate of many so-called Gastarbeiter is apposite. 
Young Turkish men were invited in the 1960s as temporary workers for 
West German factories. Afterwards, they did not return home as expected 
but brought over their families instead. An example of the latter is the 
estimate of the Blair government in 2004 that between 5,000 and 13,000 
people would migrate to the UK from Central and Eastern Europe fol-
lowing their countries’ accession to the EU. The actual number was more 
than 20 times the estimate’s upper end. 
32  Further see Andrew Brown: The myth of Eurabia: how a far-right con-
spiracy theory went mainstream, in: Guardian, 16 August 2019: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/16/the-myth-of-
eurabia-how-a-far-right-conspiracy-theory-went-mainstream 
33  Generally see Peter C. Baker: «We the people»: the battle to define popu-
lism, in: Guardian, 10 January 2019: 
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3 — This resilience of emotions’ influence in policymaking has led 
to a third preventive approach today. Worrying about demagoguery 
and disinformation regarding hot-button issues like mass migration, 
liberal democrats have characterized the underlying situation as 
«misunderstood» and popular attitudes as «mistaken». They examine 
closely such debate and reveal serial «misleading rhetorical devices, 
half-truths and questionable assumptions».34 Recent research in social 
psychology indicates, however, that their efforts should not focus on 
fact-checking about and empirical refutation of the allegedly negative 
impact of immigration in society. The debate in the West over mass 
migration is far from an exercise in truth-finding. 
According to this research, people tend to overestimate the 
relationship between immigration and criminality - generalizing 
incidents such as the Kölner Silvesternacht. It also shows that stagnant 
wages and growing inequality in Western countries are not attribut-
able to immigration. Indeed, humankind, as the «New Optimists» 
attest, may never have had it so good. Such figures may be objective 
and admit no contradiction, but they do not convince many more 
citizens, who remain discontented and disaffected.35 
Rather than by the proven balance of costs and benefits, percep-
tions in the population of immigration and of the national interest 
may be formed by memories and identity. As a German historian of 
emotions paraphrased the vox populi today, «ich fühle mich fremd 




34  Exemplary see Ali Rattansi: Migration fantasies: how not to debate immi-
gration and asylum, in: openDemocracy, 28 September 2015: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/migration-fantasies-how-not-to-
debate-immigration-and-asylum/ 




36  Wie Gefühle Politik machen: Die Historikerin Ute Frevert im Gespräch 
mit Thomas Kretschmer, Deutschlandfunk, 4 November 2018: 
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on cohesiveness and character of the community may be determi-
native. Yascha Mounk finds that «[a] lot of the anger at immigration 
is driven by fear of an imagined future rather than by displeasure 
with a lived reality».37 In eastern Europe, anxieties about national 
cohesion and demographic panic wrought by immigration - and 
emigration - help to explain the deep hostility toward migrants 
across the region in 2015.  
This research in psychology undermines key assumptions of 
public choice theory, e.g. that political actors, especially voters, 
behave rationally in their own self-interest. Such assumptions seem 
unreal and unhuman, unrelated to a current context of great and 
rapid societal change. Most people do not show themselves as 
rational, utility-maximizing actors, i.e. homines oeconomici, whose 
behaviour can be predicted, dominated, and steered. They show 
themselves as homines politici, whose thinking and action are de-
fined otherwise. This home truth makes the approach unsuited as 
a guide for life as it is in the polity and for democracy as it is in 
actuality.38 
In short, it is not relevant whether the pervasive pessimism and 
anxiety can be justified. It is relevant simply that these feelings are 
widely spread and are meaningful for those harbouring them.39 
Liberal democrats seem generally unable to make sense of memory 
and identity politics; these tend to be disregarded as irrational. 
People are expected to think straight and act sensibly. In contrast, 
nativist populists play to «perceived» – as well as «real» – concerns 
in immigration policymaking and draw a larger, more receptive 
audience than purveyors of restrained analysis. «A populist is», 




37  Yascha Mounk: The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger 
and How to Save It, Cambridge MA 2018, 174. 
38  Contrast Josiah Ober: Democracy and knowledge: innovation and learning 
in classical Athens, Princeton NJ 2009, with Geoffrey Hawthorn: A game 
called Greek democracy, in: Times Literary Supplement, 29 May 2009, 24. 
39  O. Burkeman: Is the world really better than ever? 
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across the world illustrate the power of populism: a false narrative, 
a horror story about the other, well told.»40 
Prescriptions? 
Whereas populists seize on emotions in contemporary politics, 
considering them to be central to the human condition, liberal demo-
crats treat emotions, including in this policy context, with suspicion. 
They therefore do not understand many citizens’ preferences, take 
emotions’ effects on the body politic seriously, and ultimately, allow 
for their role in democratic policymaking (regarding immigration 
or otherwise). This failure may be traced to the fact that there is no 
systematic place for emotions in democratic politics agreed among 
political theorists. The further question as to how, if at all, emotions 
might contribute constructively to policymaking on issues like im-
migration remains accordingly unanswered. 
In the last two decades, however, there has been an «emotional 
turn» in Western political theory and in judgement of political deci-
sions. Rational utilitarianism has been debunked as an inadequate 
understanding of democracy and its exclusive pursuit recognized 
as a threat long-term to democracy. Various commentators have 
sought to «compatibilize» democracy and emotions and to establish 
politics in the West on a new knowledge basis.41 These reject the 
stark dichotomy between rationality and emotionality in political 
theory, stressing their complex interactions in modern society. Rather 
than following the hierarchy in Rawlsian public reason, they also 
re-value the de-valued emotions, arguing that these are not neces-
sarily harmful for democracy.  
 
40  Suketu Mehta: Immigration panic: how the west fell for manufactured 
rage, in: Guardian, 27 August 2019: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/27/immigration-
panic-how-the-west-fell-for-manufactured-rage 
41  Exemplary see Karl Rudolf Korte (ed.): Emotionen und Politik: Begrün-
dungen, Konzeptionen und Praxisfelder einer politikwissenschaftlichen 
Emotionsforschung, Baden-Baden 2015. 
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To cite two examples: Robert Howse, a progressive legal scholar, 
greets emotionalism in contemporary US politics as part of a promising 
agenda of reform: he sees it disrupting discredited elite-dominated 
politics. Howse argues that emotionalism could be a cause - and con-
sequence - not of «mob rule» but of a more participatory and repre-
sentative form of democracy.42 For his part, historian Ian Beacock 
suggests that «we might need political emotions if our democratic 
institutions are to survive.» He observes that supporters of the 
Weimar Republic embraced policymaking as an exercise in calm, 
sober rationality, even as regards widespread, profound concerns. 
They relinquished thereby «the powerful force of political feelings 
to the antidemocratic extremes».43  
While there may be a trend to affording emotions a role in political 
processes in the West, there is no agreement about which emotions 
are most promising and should be promoted. US public intellectual 
Martha Nussbaum maintains that «love» provides an affective basis 
that can «touch citizens’ hearts and […] inspire, deliberately, strong 
emotions directed at the common work before them»44 and that can 
keep fear, disgust, and envy at bay. The way to cultivate it is through 
education and the arts. Others call for a politics based on hope: e.g. 
«[g]reater attention to the cultivation of emotions, such as hope, in 
public life might help us to understand, (re)kindle, and sustain peo-
ple’s affection for, and engagement in politics.»45 Finally, appeals for 
«empathy» are made by the likes of Barack Obama.46 The aspiration 
 
42  Robert Howse: Epilogue: In defense of disruptive democracy – A critique 
of anti-populism, in: International Journal of Constitutional Law 17/2 
(2019) 641-660. 
43  Quoted in Andrea Davies: Can political emotions destroy democracy? An 
interview with Ian Beacock, in: Stanford News, 9 April 2018: 
http://shc.stanford.edu/news/qa-research/can-political-emotions-destroy-
democracy  
44  Martha Nussbaum: Political Emotions, Cambridge MA 2014, 2. 
45  Laura Jenkins: Why do all our feelings about politics matter?, in: British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 20/1 (2018) 191.  
46  Further see Marina Fang: Obama Uses «To Kill A Mockingbird» To Remind 
Americans Of The Importance Of Empathy, in: Huffpost, 10 January 2017: 
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to social sensitivity is not merely to see things, but to feel them, as 
others do - e.g. to «walk a mile in the shoes of a Syrian refugee».  
On their own terms, these ideals are very important and com-
pelling; they approximate «motherhood and apple pie» issues. Both 
the means and prospects of their realization are, however, uncertain. 
Considered realistically, could popular support for the democratic 
system and liberal attitudes be deliberately won in the West in the 
face of the political disenchantment?  
a) Means of realization 
Further progressive commentators argue in favour of channel-
ling emotions in the community for «positive» purposes. Amid so-
cietal conflict, they seek the reorientation of relevant political actors 
toward «inspiring sentiments», which are to be directed by public 
institutions and rules of behaviour.  
The contention is that as national governments are unable to ne-
gate or override emotions, they can and should help form people’s 
responses to public issues, events, etc., especially by reference to 
political philosophy. Nussbaum argues for an official, programmatic 
attempt to be made to promote «pro-social» emotions, while curbing 
«anti-social». As regards mass migration, the positive attributes of 
character – the «better angels of our nature» – are to be invoked and 
the issue framed as a «moral opportunity». Similarly, national gov-
ernments can and should create conditions for the proper emotions 
to be expressed. Deliberative democrats, for example, speak of 
«sluices», «valves», and «filters» being set up to moderate political 
emotions in deliberation.47 Demonstrations of empathy for others, 
e.g. in the form of volunteering, sponsoring, or donating, are to be 
promoted.  
Two reservations about these proposed means of right emotions 
and positive channelling come readily to mind. First, proscribing 




47  G.S. Schaal, F. Heidenreich: Zur Rolle von Emotionen in der Demokratie. 
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contradict tenets of Rawlsian liberalism, which is otherwise to be 
upheld. These tenets include that each of us should be regarded as 
entitled to make the final choice in his/her political preferences - 
and possibly to err in so doing. Moreover, such edicts require im-
posing «a comprehensive theory of the good» on the populace.48 
How else might emotions in citizens be promoted without being 
totalitarian and specific beliefs on citizens be proscribed without 
being illiberal? - A second reservation lies in the fact that appealing 
to empathy proves particularly problematic in policymaking. 
Although empathy can be useful in getting people «to do the right 
thing», recent studies show that it can also distort people’s judg-
ment.49 Empathy is biased, as people tend naturally to feel more for 
those like them. It can even be perverted by populists into hatred 
and violence through stirring up sentiments against «the other».  
b) Prospects of realization 
The mentality and response thereby strived for are a Willkom-
menskultur of humanity, fairness, solidarity among people – as 
captured, for example, in Germans cheering and handing bonbons 
to immigrants in the streets of the nation in August 2015. How far 
do these, however, take actual human nature and behaviour into 
account? Are human beings essentially good and reasonable? Judged 
according to historical and recent experience, these emotions are 
unlikely to be realized in liberal democratic politics.  
The situations in which feelings might be expressed change 
over time; it is not the feelings themselves. The fear and hatred of 
immigrants and minority groups generally are age-old; they were 
politically potent a century ago. As an Iranian-Swiss historian of 
migration observes, «der heutige neue Rassismus in der Schweiz 
und Europa spricht nicht mehr von Rassen, sondern von anderen 
 
48  Further see A. Sajó: Emotions in constitutional design, 373: «some consti-
tution makers have thought that they have a right or duty to impose 
moral truth and proper emotion-display rules on society». 
49  Generally see Paul Bloom: Against Empathy: The case for rational compas-
sion, New York 2016; Fritz Breithaupt: Die dunklen Seiten der Empathie, 
Berlin 2017. 
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Kulturen, von Fremden, von Migranten und Migrantinnen und 
Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund. […] Die Bezeichnungen än-
dern sich, die Ausgrenzung und Diskriminierung bleibt [sic].»50 Our 
collective civic virtues have consistently proven more «ordinary» 
than heroic, despite concerted efforts at developing them through 
morality and reason. As I argue elsewhere, «[l]iberal hope and prom-
ise should be accordingly tempered by skepticism and experience of 
repeated disappointment.»51 The real question is whether the hard-
core racists, anti-Semites, xenophobes, et al. feel comfortable vocaliz-
ing and acting on their attitudes in public.52 Recent experience in the 
context of immigration is also disillusioning. Even prior to 2015, 
most citizens in Western democracies preferred that immigration 
rates be lowered or maintained – certainly not raised. Since the 
migrant crisis, the majority feels that the change wrought has been 
too fast and sweeping. The euphoria of the «German summer» of 
2015 was transient, and feelings became ambivalent over the new 
year. Debate then focused on the extent to which immigrant flows 
and access to social assistance should be reduced.  
A few reasons lie close at hand for the persistent popularity of 
notions like nativism and for the general preference for a restrictive 
immigration regime. First, the «worse» angels of our nature, e.g. ego-
ism, self-interest, Islamophobia, also influence people’s behaviour. 
Immigration may offer benefits for many and for society as a whole. 
Yet there are further consequences, burdens felt by some. Citizens 
do lose out, especially those who have few job skills, value cultural 
 
50  Kijan Espahangizi: Wir sind nicht als Fremde geboren, wir werden zu 
Fremden gemacht, foraus Blog, 16 February 2015: 
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51  Malcolm MacLaren: Where are we now? Michael Ignatieff’s The Ordinary 
Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World, in: German Law Journal 20/5 
(July 2019) 760: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.60 
52  Klaus Riexinger: Politologe im Interview: Die AfD hat das Klima, in dem 
solche Taten stattfinden, sehr deutlich mitbestimmt, in: Badische Zeitung, 
1 March 2020. 
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homogeneity, and prefer stability over change;53 in point of fact, 
immigrants are in significant respects different, and the potential for 
cultural alienation is latent; integration requires sustained effort, 
flexibility, and sacrifice on both sides to succeed.54 Second, there is 
in human psychology a «universal tendency for negative events and 
emotions to affect us more strongly than positive ones».55 Due to the 
brain’s «negativity bias» the downsides perceived in liberalized im-
migration are likely to resonate more in public discourse than the 
upsides, e.g. support for human rights, family unification, access to 
skilled labour, cultural diversity. Finally, the prescriptions proposed 
do not map well onto the world of politics in the here and now. 
Countries, even if rich, are more concerned about their own citizens 
than about «others». The «good shepherd», as Kohler’s subtitle 
notes, cannot be too good to others or he may hurt his own herd. 
In sum, it remains doubtful whether the state can and should 
moderate the affective relation in its interactions with citizens. 
These prescriptions provide no panaceas for these combustible feel-
ings in public life. A British historian observes that «[f]or humanity’s 
mental and moral incapacities there are, alas, no permanent cures, 
but we can aim to do better than we are doing right now.»56 The 
deliberative investigation of «right» policy must thereby remain 
the ideal in a liberal democracy: open discussion, broad consensus, 
and sensible outcomes. Liberal democrats must sincerely engage 
 
53  Generally see Michael J. Trebilcock: Dealing with losers: the political 
economy of policy transitions, Oxford 2013, 97-117. 
54  Further see Paul Scheffer: Presentation, 14. Bundeskongress politische 
Bildung 2019. Was uns bewegt. Emotionen in Politik und Gesellschaft, 
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with those who disagree with them and address their feelings on 
own terms. 
A prognosis 
Strong, divisive feelings tend to determine the character of the 
political debate and to drive the political agenda in the West today. 
In the context of immigration policy, these feelings have largely 
arisen from long-standing flawed discourses. The questions ad-
dressed above are whether such flawed discourses are immanent in 
liberal democracy and whether dysfunctions in the body politic are 
always to be reckoned with regarding existential questions. 
The preceding analysis suggests that the traditional model of 
liberal democracy asks for - in this policymaking context at least - 
unrealistic effort on our collective part, especially to inform ourselves 
about political issues, to prefer facts and figures to feelings, and to 
exercise «rationality» in choosing among policy options. Existential 
questions defy people’s reasoning powers, and group discussions 
even under conducive conditions may not produce «sane» and 
moderate outcomes.57 The evidence thereof in many Western coun-
tries has been a disconnect of mainstream - as opposed to populist - 
politics with the (emotional) lives of ordinary citizens. 
I have also found that attempting emotional regulation in 
Western political systems is, in practice as in theory, questionable. 
The potential for deterring or reining in «ugly» feelings of citizens - 
e.g. away from negative, pessimistic, and cynical sentiments about 
immigration and politics - is limited. Instead, certain feelings may 
be «facts» of social life that underlie values and attitudes as well as 
convey information about and messages in society.  
Accordingly, I call here for a certain pragmatism in dealing 
with emotionality. The starting point of policymaking must be life 
 
57  Further see David Miller: How about a better case?, in: Times Literary 
Supplement, 23 & 30 December 2005, 38. 
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as it is lived by citizens. The advice of former German Chancellor 
Adenauer, a practitioner who lived through many popular upheavals, 
seems particularly astute: «nehmen Sie die Menschen, wie sie sind, 
andere gibt es nicht». Preferred approaches should be non-prescriptive 
but linked to prevailing sentiments, ideas, values, and political 
culture. Especially the law, if it is to be respected and have force, 
as well as to be in force, must correspond to human reality. Ap-
proaches must correspond to the practices that can be reasonably 
expected in human lives on one hand and to the actual demands 
being made in public on the other. 
The challenge facing proponents of liberal democracy in the 
context of immigration policy is to acknowledge the emotional ap-
peal and popular traction of restrictive policies as well as to regard 
fear, anger, hatred, etc. not as external afflictions the body politic is 
to be inoculated against and/or cured of. Instead, they must recog-
nize that Western democracy are vulnerable to this sort of crisis and 
must accept a degree of powerlessness and shortfalls in realizing 
ideals. For making policy, like doing politics generally, in a de-
mocracy is «the art of the possible». As Chancellor Schröder stated 
in the 2001 German immigration bill debate, immigration is «no 
issue for an election campaign» despite the possibility of providing 
a popular mandate for legislation thereby.58 
In terms of the opening metaphor, a different understanding of 
what a «healthy» body politic is may now be proposed: health is the 
extent of illness that permits a satisfying life to be led.59 The limits 
of popular deliberation identified above suggest that the «health» 
of a liberal democracy is not absolute. Indeed, complete «well-being» 
of the body politic is, in context of «existential» questions, unattain-
able. Moreover, the body politic’s health should be considered as 
protean, varying according to the situation and specifically to the 
nature and significance of the policy issue facing it.  
 
58  Quoted in M. MacLaren: Framing the Debate over the German Immigra-
tion Bill. 
59  Paraphrasing Markus Zürcher: Ein neues Gesundheitsverständnis ist 
notwendig, in: Schweizerische Ärztezeitung 100/46 (2019) 3. 
Malcolm MacLaren: Immigration and Healthy Policymaking 172 
Postscript: As this essay was being finalized, the Turkish govern-
ment announced that the country would no longer prevent migrants 
from crossing into Europe. Turkey would open its borders, as it 
could no longer handle the numbers fleeing the war in Syria. Another 
migrant crisis may be looming … 
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